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Recently, Thompson and Dean1 argued (1) that their probabilist-
contextualist dichotomy does a better of job of carving the field of risk
studies than the positivist-relativist dichotomy proposed by me. They
also claim (2) that Starr does not espouse the positivist position I
attribute to him, and (3) that Wildavsky and Douglas do not hold the
relativist position I say they have. On the contrary, this article shows (1)
that - although my framework differs in its accounts of Wildavsky,
Douglas and lay views of risk - Thompson's and Dean's proposed
probabilist-contextualist dichotomy is nothing new. It mainly offers
new labels to describe the same positivist-relativist dichotomy,
including accompanying distinctions, articulated earlier by me. The
essay also shows (2) that Starr defends the positivist position I attribute
to him, and (3) that Wildavsky and Douglas espouse the relativist
position I attribute. Finally, the article argues (4) that the Thompson
and Dean account, unlike mine, is wrong to ignore the dangerous, anti-
populist sentiments in the Wildavsky-Douglas position on risk.
Choosing the Better Framework
Surveying competing conceptions of risk, Thompson and Dean2
argue that their probabilist-contextualist dichotomy is a better way to
"carve the field of risk studies" than the positivist-relativist dichotomy I
propose. They claim that "the probabilist-contextualist dichotomy
reformulates some familiar elements in risk debates" and "more
accurately reflects the contested nature of risk."3
Dr. Shrader-Frechette is Distinguished Research Professor at the University of
South Florida. She earned degrees (Mathematics and Physics) from Xavier University
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1 Competing Conceptions of Risk, 7 Risk 361 (1996).
2 7Risk383.
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Which label (probabilist-contextualist, positivist-relativist) better
describes the risk debate? I believe that all four labels are useful; except
for some warnings about anti-populist sentiments, discussed below,
differences between the two frameworks are trivial. To see why there is
no fundamental opposition between the two competing sets of labels,
consider, first, definitions for the terms. Probabilists, say Thompson
and Dean, see "risk as essentially characterized by the probability of
events or their consequences." 4 Contextualists, on their account,
believe "that no single attribute will be understood to characterize every
instance of risk." 5 I have said, "the cultural relativists attempt to
reduce risk evaluations to sociological constructs, ignoring their
objective, scientific content, [whereas] the naive positivists attempt to
reduce them to scientific rules, minimizing their ethical content. The
cultural relativists overemphasize values in risk evaluation and
assessment, whereas the naive positivists underemphasize them."6
Why do Thompson and Dean allege that their labels are better?
They say that, "rather than suggesting two conceptions of risk in
diametrical opposition," their "dichotomous terms represent opposite
ends of a continuum."7 They also claim to present a "more carefully
nuanced account" of risk issues than mine. However, my account is not
of two conceptions of risk in diametrical opposition; it also represents a
continuum. I say explicitly that participants in the risk debate "are
arrayed on a spectrum extending from pluralist or relativist views to
logical-empiricist [positivist] positions." 8 I also point out that
"cultural relativists overemphasize values in risk evaluation and
assessment, whereas the naive positivists underemphasize them." 9
This highly nuanced account, that Thompson and Dean appear not to
have read in full, distinguishes among differing relativists (e.g, soft
relativists, cultural relativists) and differing positivists (e.g., early or
naive positivists, later positivists) all at different spots on the values
3 7 Risk 377, 367.
4 7 Risk 369.
5 Id.
6 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality, 39 (1991).
7 7 Risk 368-369.
8 Risk and Rationality, 7.
9 Risk and Rationality, 39.
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spectrum. 10 My account also warns that "most social scientists are not
cultural relativists in the Wildavsky sense," and that "Wildavsky and
Douglas have quite different views on relativism and on risk, with
Wildavsky being more relativistic." 11 I also spend an entire chapter
discussing "the probabilistic strategy" of positivist risk assessors like
Starr. 12 Hence it is puzzling to see their probabilist-contextualist
framework offered as if it were an alternative to my account.
Is there a difference between the two accounts? Except for several
points (interpretations of Starr and Wildavsky-Douglas and of lay views
of risk) to be discussed later, they diverge only in one important
respect. Their labels (probabilist-contextualist) focus on the content of
risk claims, whereas my labels (positivist-relativist) emphasize the
epistemic reliability of risk claims. However, both sets of labels come
down to the same thing: pointing out more or less emphasis on values at
different ends of the risk spectrum. They note that, "as one moves from
probabilist to contextualist poles, risk assessment is seen as increasingly
value laden." 1 3 Similarly, I explain that "cultural relativists
overemphasize values in risk evaluation and assessment, whereas the
naive positivists underemphasize them." 14 Thompson and Dean seem
to think their account is new and more nuanced only because they omit
many distinctions along my spectrum and then claim those distinctions
as their own. In other words, their proposed probabilist-contextualist
dichotomy offers mainly new labels to describe the same
positivist-relativist dichotomy articulated earlier by me.
Starr's Positivism
The two accounts are radically different in their views of Starr,
Wildavsky, and Douglas. Let us consider these positions in order.
Thompson and Dean 1 5 argue that Starr does not espouse the
positivist position I attribute to him. 1,16 however, say that Starr is a
10 Risk and Rationality, 39ff., 232-235.
11 Risk and Rationality, 232.
12 Risk and Rationality, 89-99.
13 7 Risk 377.
14 Risk and Rationality, 39.
15 7 Risk361-384.
16 Risk and Rationality, 8.
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positivist because he ignores the values component in stage two (risk
estimation) of risk assessment and because he maintains that "risk
assessment, at least at the stage of calculating probabilities associated
with harms and estimating their effects, is completely objective, neutral,
and value free."
Thompson and Dean, on the other hand, claim that "values have a
role for Starr" 1 7 because (their only argument), in discussing
"acceptability of voluntary and involuntary risks," Starr "implies that
voluntariness is a subjective reaction." 18 Because they claim that Starr
allows value judgments at stage three (risk evaluation) of risk
assessment, they do not even make logical contact with my position.
They say risk is value-laden for Starr, because he admits values play a
role in determining risk acceptability. I, however, say Starr is a positivist
because he denies the values component in the first and second stages of
risk assessment, namely, risk identification and estimation. Moreover, I
recognize that Starr accepts the value-ladenness of (stage three) risk
evaluations; this knowledge is the reason that I clarified my claim about
Starr's positivism in terms of the first two stages of risk assessment.
Once one reads my position on Starr, it is clear that it is not at odds
with the Thompson and Dean account.
Wildavsky's and Douglas' Relativism
Thompson's and Dean's criticisms of my account of Wildavsky and
Douglas also miss the mark, but for different reasons. 19 They argue
that Wildavsky and Douglas do not espouse the relativist position I
attribute to them. Their only argument is that
throughout her other work, Douglas argues that the specific
content of beliefs about purity, danger, and social taboos is
arbitrary. Risk and Culture compared the arbitrary content
of belief systems of several cultures to make the point that
risk beliefs are part of political culture.... This view does not
deny facts about risks in general, and it most certainly does
not entail relativism with respect to specific well-
characterized elements of risk, such as the statistical
probability of events.
17 7 Risk 366.
18 Id. at 366.
19 Id.
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To defend their interpretation (just given), however, Thompson and
Dean provide no quotations, no textual analysis of Wildavsky's and
Douglas' statements. Instead they proclaim, ex cathedra, that
Wildavsky and Douglas are not relativists. My analysis, however,
derives from numerous direct quotations from Wildavsky and Douglas
that reveal their relativism.
Consider, for example, the following statements of Wildavsky and
Douglas that I have discussed repeatedly and analyzed: 20 "risks are
social constructs";21 "cno one is to say that one [risk judgment] is better
or worse" than another; 2 2 "each method [of risk evaluation] is
biased"; 2 3 when "thinking about how to choose between risks,
subjective values must take priority";24 people do risk evaluation
"according to personal ideology"; 25 "public perceptions of risk and its
acceptable levels are collective constructs... like language and... aesthetic
judgment... there is no reasoning with tastes and preferences"; 2 6 "any
form of life can be justified"; 27 and "the selection of risk is a matter of
social organization. "28
If Thompson and Dean wish to show that Wildavsky and Douglas
do not defend relativistic positions, then they need to provide analysis
of Wildavsky's and Douglas' own words, such as just given. They ought
not merely state their own undocumented opinion that Wildavsky and
Douglas are not relativists, and expect readers to accept their begging
the question. Such question begging about Wildavsky's and Douglas'
relativism is all the more questionable because I have distinguished
several types of relativism and explained the senses in which Wildavsky
is more relativistic than Douglas.29
20 Risk and Rationality, 31-39.
21 Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, 186 (1982).
22 Id. at 187, 191.
23 Id. at 71.
24 Id. at 73.
25 Id. at 194.
26 Id. at 187, 191.
27 Id. at 187-188.
28 Id. at 86-87, 98.
29 Risk and Rationality, 39ff., 232-235.
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Attacks on Populist Accounts of Risk
What is troublesome about the Thompson and Dean defense of
Wildavsky's and Douglas' Risk and Culture is that their interpretation
relies mainly on Douglas, clearly the more palatable and the less
relativistic author of the two. They also employ no direct textual
quotations to support their view and to discredit my account of
Wildavsky and Douglas. Most importantly, Thompson and Dean
present a highly selective interpretation of the position of Wildavsky
and Douglas, one that completely ignores the anti-populist sentiments
that the authors of Risk and Culture repeatedly endorse. Although
Douglas is not anti-populist in some of her other works, Wildavsky and
Douglas, in their book, explicitly admit that they are biased in favor of
centrists (those with market and hierarchical, as opposed to populist,
views) and not laypeople. 30 Wildavsky and Douglas say that lay fears
are not proportionate to the risks they face and that they "choose to be
panic-struck about dangers from technology, rather than from threats
to the economy or education.... they serve their own moral purposes by
focusing on dangers emanating from large organizations." 3 1 They
allege that laypeople's fears of industrial and technological risks is based
on "ideology" and the need to "blame" industry for "impurity," for a
"secular version of original sin." 32
Wildavsky and Douglas also claim that laypeople "can never be
satisfied" with risk reductions because they believe "there can never be
enough [safety]." 3 3 They say laypeople are dominated by
"superstitions" and by fundamentalist desires for unrealistic
environmental "purity" in their views of risk.3 4 They also claim that
laypeople are anti-industry and anti-government and that they directly
trace "chemical carcinogens in the body" to "immoral forms of
economic and political power."35 The moral of their criticisms is clear:
if laypeople are irrational about risk, then it is wise to trust the
evaluations of the "experts," usually the risk imposers.
30 Risk and Culture, 5-7, 167, 182, 198.
31 Id. at 169, 182.
32 Id. at 190; Aaron Wildavsky, Searching for Safety, 33-34 (1988).
33 Risk and Culture, 184.
34 Id, at 37-39, 80-81.
35 Id. at 46; see Wildavsky, supra note 32, at 33-34.
Shrader-Frechette: Risk Frameworks and the Public 7
It is important to note both Wildavsky's and Douglas' anti-populist
claims as well as their relativism because both are dangerous to
democratic social and political structures. Apart from their criticisms of
lay views of risk, their relativism also contributes to a pro-industry and
anti-populist bias, a the following reasoning shows: Large industrial
and technological concerns tend to be imposers of potentially
catastrophic risks, while members of the public tend to be potential risk
victims. But if risk imposers (chemical companies, for example) are
innocent until proved guilty, and if relativism precludes accurate
evaluation of harm and authentic proof that someone is guilty of
imposing probable harm, then risk imposers cannot be shown guilty and
must be presumed innocent. In other words, stopping unjustified or
dangerous risk impositions, within a purely relativistic framework, is
like stopping murders within a crime context in which no one ever finds
any bodies. Neither those who fight unjustified risks nor those who
fight unjustified homicides can make headway without meeting certain
epistemic constraints necessary for evidence. Wildavsky and Douglas
- and other relativists - are dangerous because they deny the
epistemic conditions that are necessary for the possibility of proving risk
imposers are wrong.
Once one sees the anti-populist bias of Wildavsky and Douglas in
Risk and Culture and of Wildavsky in books such as Searching for
Safety, it is possible to see why I am so interested in clarifying the
rationality of risk decisions. My theme is that experts do not have a
"corner" on rationality. They do not have the last word about risk facts
(how safe is safe enough) because risk decisions are also a matter of how
safe is equitable enough, how safe is voluntary enough, how safe is
informed enough, and how safe is compensated enough. Such
considerations are a matter of neither probabilities nor contexts but
instead a matter of fundamental and inalienable human rights. I
describe the risk debate in terms of positivist-relativist stances because I
am interested in the power behind competing risk claims. I am
interested in the way that expert claims to hegemony in the risk debate
ignore rightful claims of the public, claims that often focus on whether
people can trust the experts. Talk about probabilities and contexts -
and not also about positivists (who claim always to be right) and about
relativist (who claim no view of risk is more correct than another) -
8 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 1 [Winter 1997]
does not capture the essential risk dispute over power. This controversy
is over whether alleged risk experts have the right to ignore concerns of
potential risk victims.
Thompson and Dean miss the "blood and guts" aspects of risk
debates, the concerns about whose ox is getting gored. Their labels and
their account completely ignore the anti-populist bias in the work of
Wildavsky and Douglas. Indeed, their very words seem to indicate
Thompson's and Dean's own distrust of the public. Their opening
paragraph asserts that "experts who study risk or risk issues are more
likely to develop well-defined, internally consistent conceptions of risk
than members of the lay public."3 6 Thompson and Dean, however,
seem to have too much faith in the experts and too little faith in the
public. Contrary to their claims, experts may not develop well-defined
conceptions of risk because they often ignore important social, political,
and ethical concerns of the public. These include rights to bodily
security, rights to equal protection, rights to full compensation for risks,
rights to free informed consent, rights to avoid risk-related violations of
due process, and experts' tendencies to pass off subjective risk
probabilities as "science." Experts' tendencies to define risks narrowly
and quantitatively does not mean that their definitions are well defined.
Nor do their reductionist emphases on a few quantitative aspects of risk
mean that their accounts are more "internally consistent" than those of
laypeople. 37 Prima facie, there are grounds for being suspicious of any
authors who denigrate lay views of risk and who then proffer their
account as "more accurately" representing the risk debate.3 8 Even, and
especially, risk victims have the right to be wrong. Those who bear the
burdens have the right to accept or reject the load.
36 7 Risk 362.
37 See Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 Risk 115
(1995).
38 7 Risk 377, 367.
